Abstract I argue that Sartre's conception of freedom is best understood when read in light of the Cartesian Meditations . Drawing on the often-neglected article on ‘Cartesian Freedom’, I demonstrate how Sartre, in Being and Nothingness , re-enacts the transition from the Third to Fourth Meditation – from the causal proof of God's existence to the problem of error and free will defence. Using a Cartesian-like distinction between objective and formal reality, Sartre argues for the ontological independence of the in-itself, committing to compatibilism about freedom. He addresses the Cartesian challenge of non-being and freedom as the ability to do otherwise, finally resolving the paradox of freedom by viewing situations as ambiguously shaped by absolute freedom and partial dependence on reality. Thus, my approach illuminates the historical and systematic depth of Sartre's middle ground between libertarianism and determinism.
Christos Kalpakidis (2025) studied this question.