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When using protected Wi-Fi protocols such as WPA2 and WPA3, the access point that you connect to is authenticated by the client. This prevents an adversary from creating a rogue clone of the Wi-Fi network, and implies that the name of a network, called SSID, cannot be spoofed. However, in this paper we demonstrate that a client can be tricked into connecting to a different protected Wi-Fi network than the one it intended to connect to. That is, the client's user interface will show a different SSID than the one of the actual network it is connected to. The root cause is a design flaw in the IEEE 802.11 standard, causing the SSID to not always be authenticated. We demonstrate the practical impact of this attack, find that all tested devices are vulnerable to the attack, and propose backwards-compatible defenses as well as updates to the standard.
Gollier et al. (2024) studied this question.
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