Non-explosive sabotage has been a persistent and adaptive form of conflict across history, yet it remains underexplored in both military history and security studies. This article examines the conceptual, strategic, and operational dimensions of sabotage that avoids explosive force, drawing on pre-industrial, industrial, world war, Cold War, and post-industrial case studies. Using a historical-comparative qualitative methodology, the study analyses archival sources, resistance manuals, industrial records, and primary accounts, supplemented by secondary scholarship. Findings indicate that non-explosive sabotage has historically exploited systemic vulnerabilities, asymmetries of power, and civilian agency, producing strategic effects disproportionate to the resources employed. The study develops a typology of targets—including infrastructure, logistics, industrial production, information systems, and human capital—and assesses the effectiveness, risk profiles, and ethical implications of these practices. By integrating historical lessons with contemporary considerations of cyber-physical systems, gray-zone conflict, and resilience planning, the article provides insights into modern vulnerabilities and informs strategic, policy, and ethical debates in security and civil defense.
Kim Robin Thuemler (2026) studied this question.