Sterba’s Argument from Evil and Objections to Divine Command Theory

This paper will respond to James Sterba’s paper “An Ethics without God That is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution”. In his paper, Sterba argues that God cannot be the source of morality. Sterba maintains this position because he believes that his problem of extreme suffering entails that God cannot exist. Furthermore, Sterba argues that divine command theory has a number of serious problems confronting it. Alternatively, Sterba maintains that one can account for objective morality without appealing to God’s nature and/or commands. In response, this paper grants that Sterba presents a logically consistent account of objective morality without appealing to God’s nature and/or commands. However, this paper also cites a couple of reasons why one might think that God is still the better explanation for objective morality. This paper furthermore argues that Sterba’s objections do not demonstrate that divine command theory is false. The main thrust of this paper, though, focuses on Sterba’s argument about horrendous suffering. This paper argues that Sterba’s argument on horrendous suffering (while challenging) does not prove that a morally perfect God could not exist.