Against the backdrop of carbon quota trading policies and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC), Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) engage in supply chain emission reduction via embedded low-carbon services. However, the impact mechanism of their financing mode selection on emission reduction efficiency and economic benefits has not been fully revealed, and there is a lack of support from a systematic theoretical and engineering design framework. Therefore, this study innovatively constructs a multi-agent Stackelberg game model with bank financing, green bond financing, and internal factoring financing. We incorporate the embedding degree, emission reduction cost coefficient, and financing mode selection into a unified analysis framework. The research findings are as follows: (1) There is a significant positive linear relationship between supply chain profit and the embedding degree. In contrast, the profit of ESCOs shows an inverted “U-shaped” change trend. Moreover, there is a sustainable cooperation threshold for each of the three financing modes. (2) Green bond financing can significantly increase the overall emission reduction rate of the industrial supply chain in high-embedding-degree scenarios. However, due to emission reduction investment cost pressure, ESCOs tend to choose bank financing. (3) The dynamic change of the emission reduction investment cost coefficient will trigger a reversal effect on the financing preferences of the supply chain and ESCOs. This study unveils the internal mechanism of multi-party decision-making in the low-carbon industrial supply chain and is supported by cross-country institutional evidence and comparative case-based analysis, providing a scientific basis and engineering design guidance for optimizing ESCO financing strategies, crafting incentive contracts, and enhancing government subsidy policies.
Deng et al. (2026) studied this question.