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February 5, 2026Religions0 citationsOpen Access

Governing Religious Symbols in the State: Neutrality, Identity and Coercive Public Officials Under Quebec’s Bill 21

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CCChristian J. Backenköhler Casajús

Key Points

  • The goal is to examine the governance of religious symbols within Quebec’s Bill 21 and its implications for pluralism and fundamental rights.
  • Doctrinal analysis of Canadian constitutional law
  • Examination of European Court case law
  • Critical discussion of the Bouchard–Taylor model of secularism
  • Analysis of legislative attempts and the notwithstanding clause
  • Quebec's lawmakers invoke European jurisprudence to justify restrictions on religious symbols.
  • Impartiality is equated with strict neutrality, reflecting the majority’s cultural assumptions.
  • The approach disproportionately affects religious minorities, limiting their rights and access to public employment.

Abstract

This article analyzes the governance of religious diversity in public employment through the study of Quebec’s Bill 21. It examines how the State uses neutrality to manage religious symbols, focusing on implications for pluralism and fundamental rights within democratic governance frameworks and diversity regulation in plural societies. It situates Bill 21 within Quebec’s longer legal and political trajectory, marked by failed legislative attempts, recourse to the “notwithstanding clause,” and deep social polarisation around the construction of a francophone, secular identity. Methodologically, the study combines doctrinal analysis of Canadian constitutional law with a detailed examination of European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union case law, as well as a critical discussion of the Bouchard–Taylor Commission’s model of “open secularism” and later reinterpretations by Bouchard, Taylor and Maclure. The article finds that Quebec’s lawmakers selectively invoke European jurisprudence and the language of neutrality to justify far-reaching restrictions on visible religious symbols, especially for officials with coercive powers such as judges, police and prison staff, in ways that go beyond typical European practice. It argues that equating impartiality with an appearance of strict neutrality reflects the cultural assumptions of the majority and produces discriminatory effects on religious minorities, limiting both freedom of religion and equal access to public employment. The conclusion contends that neutrality should be assessed primarily through officials’ conduct rather than their appearance and that more inclusive models of secularism—grounded in open secularism and reasonable accommodation—offer better tools for reconciling State neutrality, pluralism and fundamental rights.

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Cite This Study

Christian J. Backenköhler Casajús (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6984359ef1d9ada3c1fb491ahttps://doi.org/10.3390/rel17020184
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