Disclosure Strategies in Shared Manufacturing: A Game- Theoretic Analysis of Third-Party Versus Self-Built Platforms

To address the challenge of complex quality control in shared manufacturing arising from loose “partner” relationships, a quality disclosure mechanism is incorporated into a shared manufacturing supply chain. By developing a platform-led game-theoretic model, it compares four quality disclosure strategies under third-party and self-built shared manufacturing platforms, filling a theoretical gap on how quality disclosure aligns with different platform models. The findings indicate that: (1) Quality disclosure always increases platform profit, providing theoretical support for the economic incentives for platforms to promote quality transparency. (2) Under third-party shared manufacturing platforms, all manufacturers prefer unilateral disclosure by the high-quality manufacturer, indicating that this platform model naturally generates a high-quality-led signaling mechanism and reduces coordination costs. (3) Under self-built shared manufacturing platforms, strategy choice is conditional: when the disclosure level is very high, the high-quality manufacturer counter-intuitively induces the low-quality manufacturer to disclose in order to avoid excessive guarantee risk; when the market quality gap is large, bilateral disclosure is the equilibrium, jointly building market trust; when the quality gap narrows, the equilibrium returns to unilateral disclosure by the high-quality manufacturer to strengthen the quality signal.This study provides a new theoretical framework for understanding quality signaling in multi-actor collaborative settings and offers managerial insights for shared manufacturing platforms to design disclosure mechanisms and for manufacturers to choose cooperation modes.