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February 28, 2026The Journal of Private Markets Investing0 citations

Platforms, Portals, and Private Markets: A Structural Economics of Name, Image, and Likeness

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FFFrank J. FabozziMIMichael B. Imerman

Key Points

  • The article aims to reinterpret NIL rights as a market for intangible athlete assets instead of a wage-setting system.
  • Analyzes NIL compensation through the lens of structural economics.
  • Examines the NCAA transfer portal as a repricing mechanism.
  • Applies theories of private market economics and platform design.
  • Identifies volatility and frequent renegotiation as inherent features of NIL.
  • Demonstrates that compensation dispersion is a structural aspect of the market.
  • Highlights the influence of institutional context and information flow on athlete valuations.

Abstract

Name, Image, and Likeness (NIL) rights are commonly framed as a labor-market reform that compensates college athletes for previously unpaid work. This article advances a different interpretation of NIL, as a platform-mediated private market for intangible athlete assets rather than a wage-setting system. NIL compensation reflects negotiated valuations of identity-based, illiquid assets shaped by exposure, narrative, and institutional context. The NCAA transfer portal functions as the central repricing mechanism, transforming latent valuations into contestable negotiations through episodic information revelation. Drawing on private market economics, platform theory, incomplete contracting, and real options logic, we explain why volatility, frequent renegotiation, and compensation dispersion are structural features rather than transitional failures. By viewing NIL within this context, we identify several policy implications, including the role of portal access rules in regulating the frequency of valuation resets, the importance of platform design and transparency in shaping information flow, and the difficulty of applying labor-market regulation to platform-mediated private markets.

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Cite This Study

Fabozzi et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69a287690a974eb0d3c030e6https://doi.org/10.3905/jpmi.2026.1.016
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