Abstract When I am unable to drive due to a road blockade, there seems to be a morally relevant difference between a case in which the road is blocked by workers and a case in which the road is blocked by a landslide. Many political philosophers tried to capture this pretheoretical judgment at a more abstract level through the formulation of a concept of freedom. They argue that one is unfree when one's inability is casually or morally brought about by others but merely unable when one's inability is brought about by oneself or nature. The causality view of freedom holds that I am unfree to drive because the workers are causally responsible for the blockade, whereas the responsibility view of freedom holds that to determine whether I am unfree, we should ask whether the workers are morally responsible for the blockade. Each view has some strengths and weaknesses. I capture their strengths and avoid their weaknesses by suggesting a novel interpretation of moral responsibility as answerability , according to which we are answerable for all our actions in virtue of the fact that our actions reflect our evaluative judgments. This interpretation allows for a plausible resolution of the disagreement between these views.
Ilkin Huseynli (2026) studied this question.