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March 19, 2026IIMS Journal of Management Science1 citations

Capital Structure, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance of Non-financial Listed Firms: Board Structure Elements’ Moderating Role in an Emerging Economy

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RERonald Ebenezer Essel

Key Points

  • This research aims to explore how board characteristics moderate the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate performance in non-financial firms.
  • Quantitative approach using panel-data design
  • Two-step system GMM dynamic modelling for endogeneity correction
  • Analysis of financial data from 25 non-financial listed firms from 2010 to 2019
  • Total-debt-to-equity-ratio and financial risk negatively impact corporate performance
  • Total-equity-to-assets-ratio and cash conversion cycle positively influence corporate performance
  • Board size, independence, and gender diversity strengthen relationships between capital and ownership structures and performance

Abstract

This article investigates the moderating role of board size (BS), board independence (BI) and board gender diversity (BGD) in the relationships among capital structure (CS), ownership structure (OS) and the performance of non-financial listed firms in Ghana. A quantitative approach, using a panel-data design with endogeneity correction via two-step system GMM dynamic modelling, was employed to analyse financial data from 25 non-financial listed firms spanning 2010–2019. Findings indicated that total-debt-to-equity-ratio (TDTER), total-debt-to-assets-ratio (TDTAR), long-term-debt-ratio (LTDR) and financial risk (FR) significantly and negatively impacted FP. Conversely, total-equity-to-assets-ratio (TETAR), short-term-debt-ratio (STDR), cash conversion cycle (CCC), total assets turnover (TAT), tangibility (TANG), sales growth (GROW), firm size (SZ) and firm age (AGE) significantly and positively influenced FP. Bulk-shareholding (BSH) had a significantly positive effect on FP, while individual-shareholding (ISH) did not. BS, BI and BGD moderated/strengthened the relationships among CS, OS and FP. Findings/Results underscore the risk of high borrowing costs for highly-geared firms, advocating for corporate deleveraging, optimal CS and OS and improved governance practices. This study’s framework, though specific to Ghana, can be applied to other emerging economies, as it integrates previously unexplored/uncharted CG metrics of BS, BI and BGD into Agency Theory (AT), extending the theory’s scope, making it more rigorous/robust and generalisable. This theory extension-driven approach offers novel theoretical/conceptual/methodological insights, along with detailed, context-specific, practical/managerial and policy implications. JEL Classification: G10, G32, G34, G38

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Cite This Study

Ronald Ebenezer Essel (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69bb92df496e729e629808achttps://doi.org/10.1177/0976030x251404244
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