Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are increasingly applied to mitigate extreme class imbalance in intrusion detection systems, yet reported improvements often obscure role augmentation intensity and adversarial stability. This paper presents a controlled ablation study that isolates the impact of adversarial objective choice, augmentation ratio, and training duration on GAN-based minority data augmentation for highly imbalanced tabular cybersecurity data. Using the UWF-ZeekData22 dataset, nine MITRE ATT&CK tactic-versus-benign classification tasks are evaluated under augmentation ratios of 0.25 and 0.50 and training durations of 400 and 800 epochs. Four GAN variants—Vanilla GAN, Conditional GAN (cGAN), WGAN, and WGAN-GP—are assessed using stratified cross-validation and five classical classifiers representing diverse inductive biases. The results reveal consistent structural patterns. Moderate augmentation (r = 0.25) with controlled training (400 epochs) yields the most stable and reliable improvement in minority recall. Wasserstein-based objectives demonstrate superior stability under aggressive augmentation and prolonged training, while conditional GANs frequently exhibit recall collapse in ultra-sparse regimes. Increasing augmentation volume does not uniformly improve performance and may introduce distributional overlaps that degrade linear and margin-based classifiers. Tree-based classifiers remain largely invariant once sufficient minority density is achieved. These findings demonstrate that adversarial calibration is more important than architectural complexity for improving the detection of rare attacks. The study provides practical guidance for designing robust GAN-based augmentation pipelines under extreme cybersecurity class imbalance.
Debelie et al. (2026) studied this question.