This paper argues that, for four decades, debates on intentionality have been constrained by a false tripartite dilemma: intentionality must be grounded either in consciousness (Searle), interpretation (Dennett), or evolutionary history (Millikan). We show that all three approaches share a common flaw: they seek the source of intentionality either in the material substrate or in the observer, rather than in the dynamic organization of the cognitive system itself. We propose a way out of this impasse through the framework of Evolving Cognitive Architectures (ECA). On this view, intentionality is neither an intrinsic metaphysical property nor a mere observer-relative projection. Instead, it emerges from the satisfaction of specific organizational conditions—conditions that can be formally specified and empirically assessed. This paper makes two central contributions. First, it offers a diagnostic critique showing how Searle, Dennett, and Millikan each commit a similar category mistake by conflating the correlates or detection methods of intentionality with its constitutive conditions. Second, it introduces the ECA framework, articulated through five formal specifications of cognitive agency: (1) organizational continuity, (2) dynamic memory circulation, (3) representational reconfiguration, (4) non-arbitrary internal semantics, and (5) interactive developmental plasticity. Rather than adding another position to an established debate, the ECA framework reframes the problem of intentionality itself—shifting the focus from metaphysical grounding to architectural organization, and from thought experiments to formally testable conditions for cognitive agency.
Najm abe housh (2026) studied this question.