Abuse of economic dependence (superior bargaining position) in competition law: concerns, benefits, and safeguards

Abstract Abuse of economic dependence, or abuse of superior bargaining position, has increasingly been introduced as a standalone prohibition within competition law across jurisdictions. This article explores why such dependence-centred competition rules are adopted, with what policy objectives, and how implementing jurisdictions address the concerns raised about them. It first maps legislative and institutional designs across 34 jurisdictions and identifies 13 systems with explicit provisions for abuse of dependence, operating alongside abuse of dominance. It then discusses the principal concerns surrounding such rules and weighs them against their complementary benefits, taking into account internal safeguards used in practice. This article notes that, while the concerns are reasonable and may justify non-adoption, this does not, in itself, mean that adoption is inherently misguided. It highlights that dependence-centred rules have complementary advantages—bringing the vertical power-over dimension to the centre of power analysis and enabling a more flexible, dynamic assessment of competitive harm—and that, with safeguards, such as structural power and impact screens, the concerns can be mitigated in practice. It concludes that, when so designed, dependence-centred rules can serve as a balanced complement and outlines directions for future research.