Abstract Amid the reconfiguration of the post-Cold War world order since the mid-2000s, the evolution of the European Union's positioning towards China has been primarily a response to the constraints imposed by the relative decline of US hegemony and episodes of erosion of the transatlantic link, as well as by the growing US–China rivalry. Seeking to elucidate the evolution and implications of the EU's navigation of this rivalry amid China's rise, including in the Indo-Pacific, this article scrutinizes dynamics of strategization at EU and member states levels, including by examining predominant French, German and pre-Brexit UK approaches. It argues that the evolution of the EU's approach embodies a form of strategic pragmatism, conceptualized as a consolidated long-term realist, contingent and compromise approach, aiming to enable strategic coherence in complexity. Taking a strategic perspective by analysing EU strategies, from the first communication on China in 1995 to the 2023 ‘de-risking’ approach, and building on fieldwork research, it demonstrates that for the EU, strategizing pragmatism has amounted to moving from a practice to a praxis of pragmatism. While pointing to its limits, the article ultimately concludes on the relevance of strategic pragmatism as the EU moves forward in a shifting global order.
Brice Didier (2026) studied this question.