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April 10, 2026Sustainability0 citationsOpen Access

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Industrial Robot-Driven Air Pollution Synergistic Governance Incorporating Public Environmental Satisfaction

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HQHao QinShenyang University of TechnologyXZXiao ZhongShenyang University of TechnologyRMRui MaShenyang Institute of Engineering

Key Points

  • This research aims to analyze the interplay between industrial robots, public satisfaction, and governance in air pollution management.
  • Constructed an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, and the public.
  • Incorporated variables of public environmental satisfaction and industrial robot application.
  • Utilized theoretical analysis and numerical simulation to explore stakeholder interactions.
  • Government supervision impacts enterprises' willingness for green transformation.
  • Cost-benefit parameters crucially influence strategic choices among stakeholders.
  • Public supervision effectiveness depends on supervision costs and incentive benefits.

Abstract

Against the dual backdrop of worsening air pollution and industrial intelligent transformation, industrial robot technology has become an important means to promote air pollution synergistic governance. This study innovatively incorporates public environmental satisfaction and industrial robot application as dynamic mechanism variables, constructing an evolutionary game model involving the government, industrial enterprises, and the public. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, the study reveals the influence mechanism of key cost–benefit parameters on stakeholders’ strategic interaction and the system’s evolution path. The conclusions are as follows: (1) The government’s environmental supervision directly affects enterprises’ green transformation willingness, and enterprises’ behavior reversely impacts public satisfaction and supervision effectiveness, forming a “supervision–response–feedback” closed-loop. (2) The cost and benefit parameters related to industrial robots are crucial for the evolution of the game system, and there is significant heterogeneity in their impact on the strategic choices of the three parties. The robot adaptation transformation of enterprise industrial depends on the comprehensive consideration of the transformation cost and the green benefits. Public supervision is regulated by both the supervision cost and the incentive benefit. The government regulation takes into account both the regulatory cost and the loss of social reputation. Various parameters dynamically regulate the system’s equilibrium by altering the party’s cost–benefit structure. (3) The application of industrial robots and the feedback of public environmental satisfaction form a coupling effect, jointly determining the long-term evolution direction of the game system. When the cost benefit and supervision incentives are well-matched, enterprises will actively promote the green transformation of industrial robots in order to achieve intelligent pollution control. The effectiveness of public supervision has also been fully realized. The dynamic adaptation of the two components can lead the system towards an efficient and stable equilibrium in air pollution governance.

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Cite This Study

Qin et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69d895be6c1944d70ce06cdahttps://doi.org/10.3390/su18083664
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