Sentencing for multiple counts: a data analysis perspective of the applied Lebanese law

We examine Article 205 of the Lebanese penal code which gives convicts the right to ask for the most severe penalty instead of consecutive penalties in the event of multiple offences given that no final verdict has been issued for any of the offences. We make the following contributions in this paper: 1) model multi-offender versus judge/legislator interactions as a non-zero-sum game; 2) provide statistical description of offences; 3) propose an alternative utility in the proposed model; 4) show the Nash equilibrium which is one in which offenders are taking advantage of bulk discount to commit more crimes before a verdict is issued; 5) shed light on the interpretation of this model by interviewing 13 judges. The median number of crimes committed by an offender is 4 and the median number of days between rulings is 61. We outline a framework to strengthen the effectiveness of the legal system.