This study investigates how economic scarcity influences third-party punishment, a costly and non-self-interested behavior that plays a critical role in maintaining social norms and cooperation. In real-world contexts, individuals often operate under resource constraints that may systematically alter their cost–benefit calculations; however, it remains unclear whether and how scarcity affects the willingness to punish unfairness. Across two experiments, we examined whether scarcity reduces individuals’ propensity to engage in third-party punishment. Experiment 1, involving 70 participants, showed that individuals under scarcity allocated significantly fewer resources to sanction unfair dictators than those in a control condition. Experiment 2, with 41 participants, replicated this design across two time points separated by 2 months. The results further confirmed the suppressing effect of scarcity on punishment and demonstrated a similar pattern of results across time points. These findings offer important theoretical and practical implications for promoting cooperation and effective norm enforcement under resource-limited conditions.
Liang et al. (2026) studied this question.