Despite broad agreement on sensorimotor foundations of cognition, existing integrative models are not user-friendly to those who most need them—parents, caregivers, teachers, and clinical practitioners. This review addresses that gap by proposing Meaning-Events (M-Es) as sensorimotor–cognitive coordination units that structure meaning from infancy through adulthood. Drawing on joint attention research, embodied cognition, and dynamic skill theory, this integrative model demonstrates how sensorimotor processes—gaze coordination, affective timing/synchrony, bodily orientation, eye–hand coordination, and goal-directed action—organize cognitive structures of increasingly abstract meaning-making. Meaning-Events are shown as the smallest analyzable units that integrate sensorimotor experience with cognition, providing (1) developmental continuity for embodied action giving rise to coherent thought, purpose, and identity; (2) reciprocal perspectives informing impacts of dyadic behavioral interactions; and (3) an analytical and synthetic tool providing visible, measurable differentiation and integration of behaviors over time. Integration of Fischer’s dynamic skill theory with Erikson’s psychosocial theory illustrates applications in clinical and educational contexts. Rather than viewing sensorimotor experience as an early precursor superseded by symbolic cognition, the Meaning-Event model positions these sensorimotor–cognitive coordination units as constitutive of meaning at all developmental levels.
Julia Penn Shaw (2026) studied this question.