Peru has developed an extensive set of regulations, managerial instruments, and trade standards, largely influenced by free trade agreements, that appear to ensure strict control of the Amazonian timber supply chain. In practice, however, at least 20 per cent of logging is illegal (and up to 86 per cent in some areas), around 70 per cent of companies are informal, and there is repeated evidence of labour exploitation and forced labour. This article explores the relationship between these elements through a systematic review of regulatory and corporate frameworks, interviews with timber workers in Amazonian river ports, and an expert panel analysis. The findings reveal not so much a system of control as one that simulates control: a dense institutional framework that is highly permeable to illegal flows, a traceability scheme that looks modern but lacks accountability, and a trade chain that ultimately relies on a forest regent, a notebook, and a pen. In short, the Peruvian timber sector presents a paradox of international regulatory frameworks and enforcement weaknesses, where compliance is more often performed than achieved.
Campos-Vásquez et al. (2026) studied this question.