On the Moral Implications of Odera Oruka’s 'Human Minimum' Approach to Fighting Extreme Poverty in Africa

In this paper, I consider the concept of “human minimum” as proposed by H. Odera Oruka to obligate responsibility as an approach to eliminating extreme poverty in Africa and beyond. I aim to establish why it is morally problematic and economically counterproductive to demand equal moral responsibility from all moral agents, irrespective of their economic differences, in the fight against extreme poverty. To achieve the latter, I attempt to answer two significant questions: What are some of the moral implications of ensuring that a society attains the human minimum as an approach to eliminating extreme poverty? Who has a greater moral responsibility for ensuring the attainment of the human minimum between the government, non-governmental/nonprofit organisations, and individual members of society? In Oruka’s philosophy, enforcement of a global “human minimum” is the equal moral obligation of all moral agents—defined as those situated above the poverty line. I will demonstrate why ignoring the economic differences – and inequalities – of those who qualify as moral agents in Oruka’s conceptualisation of extreme poverty, particularly in continental Africa, risks plunging more of those who live slightly above the human minimum threshold into extreme poverty.