Abstract Can three metaphysical wrongs make a right? Monism, idealism, and panentheism each sit well outside the contemporary mainstream. I argue that, suitably combined, they form a mutually supporting triad. The key move draws on a form of idealism according to which bodies are merely representational objects of mental representation. Applied to panentheism, this yields the view that everything besides God exists wholly in God as the object of a divine idea. That proposal specifies the elusive “in” relation of panentheism while preventing the world’s limitations and evils from bleeding into the divine nature. In turn, panentheism supplies idealism with a single divine mind to anchor its dependence claims, and together these commitments amount to a nonmereological form of priority monism. I close by examining whether the view can distinguish actuality from mere possibility and secure genuine finite subjectivity.
Samuel Newlands (2026) studied this question.