In this paper, I propose and defend a recognition theory of the Hobbesian right of nature. Contrary to the mainstream liberty right interpretation, I argue that the right of nature has stronger normative force than a Hohfeldian liberty right, and it is the ground for juridical obligations. The reason why it is ineffective in the state of nature is that it is offset and violated by other people's equal rights. One crucial step of achieving peace is that people need to lay down their invasive rights and thereby recognize and respect other people's rights as genuine rights, which cannot be fully achieved without a sovereign power. Specifically, by analyzing Hobbes's famous analogy between the state where everyone has a right to everything and the state where no right exists, I show that the right in this analogy can only be a "claim". In addition, I argue that in Leviathan, by introducing his new metaphysical definition of liberty, Hobbes transforms the right of nature into a right of "no impediment" that grounds other people's obligation to not impede.
Hanyang Zhao (2025) studied this question.