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June 21, 2026Journal of Competition Law & Economics0 citations

Beyond Interchange Fee Caps: Rethinking Merchant Choice and Competition in European Payments

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RIRoman InderstTVTommaso VallettiCWChristoph Wentzien

Key Points

  • The article aims to address challenges in European payment markets and propose reforms for improved merchant choice.
  • Examined the impact of the EU Interchange Fee Regulation on merchants in Europe.
  • Developed proposals for adjusting fee regulation to enhance merchant payment options.
  • Explored possible remedies in e-commerce and mobile payments.
  • Merchants face high, opaque costs despite existing fee caps on card transactions.
  • Proposals include enabling direct debit from card data and requiring banks to issue multiple debit cards.
  • Advocated for structural reforms to enhance competition rather than solely relying on fee regulation.

Abstract

Abstract This article examines the persistent challenges in European payment markets a decade after the EU Interchange Fee Regulation. Despite fee caps on debit and credit card transactions, merchants continue to face limited choice and high, often opaque costs, as international card schemes raise nonregulated fees and consumer reliance on cash diminishes. We argue that regulation focused solely on price caps has proven insufficient to address structural imbalances at the point of sale and, possibly to a lesser extent, in e-commerce. Although we also set out proposals for adjusting fee regulation, the core of our analysis is a shift in policy towards strengthening merchants’ effective choice of payment instruments. Two complementary approaches are developed: first, enabling merchants to initiate direct debit transactions directly from payment card data, thus creating a genuine outside option that disciplines card-based fees; second, breaking single-homing of cardholders by requiring banks to issue multiple branded debit cards or by preventing (quasi-)exclusive issuing arrangements. We also explore tentative remedies in e-commerce and mobile payments, where merchants may, on the one hand, enjoy a wider choice, but digital wallets and intermediaries may also create new ‘must-have’ bottlenecks. Overall, the paper advocates structural reforms to restore competition rather than relying exclusively on fee regulation.

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Cite This Study

Inderst et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a37815a24f042ddf4c5b45dhttps://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhag019
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