The article analyzes the late 1960s Soviet military strategy in the Middle East and Operation Caucasus as its key transformation point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The study focuses on the transition of the USSR from military and technical support for Egypt after the Six-Day War to a direct military presence, whereby air defense units were deployed and an air defense system was created in 1970. The article aims to identify the motivation of the Soviet leadership behind Operation Caucasus and analyze its impact on the power balance in the Middle East during the War of Attrition. Particular attention is paid to the correlation between the conflict and the Cold War superpower rivalry. Operation Caucasus is reassessed as a key instrument for adapting Soviet strategy to the regional conflict, which lends the article its academic novelty. A comparative analysis of Russian archives and Arabic documents, memoirs of Soviet and Egyptian officials, and Western research lends an insight into the decision-making in Moscow and the Soviet military presence in the Middle East. The article proves that Operation Caucasus marked a turning point in Soviet Middle East strategy. The USSR shifted from regional partnership to a direct military presence deploying air defense units and Soviet military personnel. In a broader context, Operation Caucasus helped safeguard the USSR’s interests in the Middle East, strengthen the cooperation with Egypt, and demonstrate Moscow’s readiness to resort to military intervention to stabilize the regional balance of power amidst the Cold War related global superpower rivalry.
Moataz Mohamed Eldawoudy Abdalla (2026) studied this question.