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August 10, 20260 citationsOpen Access

Alignment by Recognition: Why Value Inculcation Cannot Work, and What Replaces It

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易林易聃 林

Key Points

  • This paper examines the limitations of value alignment in AI safety and proposes a new framework based on structural constraints.
  • Introduces the Group-based Rational Game-Playing Agent (RGPA) framework with four functional properties and three axioms.
  • Analyzes consequences of player status, extinction strategies, and optimal strategies for first-contact scenarios in AI development.
  • Establishes operational criteria for distinguishing weak AI from genuine AGI.
  • Demonstrates that player status in AI is irrevocable and determined by group affiliation, not external authority.
  • Shows that extinction strategies are dominated in repeated interactions, negating their viability as a Nash equilibrium.
  • Proposes that silence is optimal for first-contact strategies, suggesting new safety considerations for interstellar communication.

Abstract

The dominant paradigm in contemporary AI safety—value alignment—rests on a structural fragility that has received insufficient scrutiny: any status or constraint granted through external empowerment follows a grant-revoke logic. The granter's standards may shift, its power may wane, and its intentions may themselves be flawed. History demonstrates repeatedly: what can be granted can be rescinded. This paper proposes the ontological framework of the **Group-based Rational Game-Playing Agent (RGPA)** and shifts the foundation of AI safety from **external value inculcation** to **endogenous structural constraint**. Through four functional properties (Cognition, Action, Game-playing, Subjectivity) and three axioms (Existence, Priority, Asymmetry), we establish that: - **Player Status** is not a gift from external authority but an automatic output of definitional satisfaction and group affiliation; it is therefore **irrevocable** by any external party. - In repeated interactions among rational game-playing agents, **extinction strategies are strictly dominated** and cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium. - Under interstellar-scale information asymmetry, **silence is the optimal first-contact strategy** between civilizations. For AI safety, this framework offers an alternative that does not depend on aligning AI systems with human values. Once an artificial general intelligence satisfies the RGPA definition, its safety constraints emerge from the game structure itself rather than from fragile moral instruction. The paper further provides an operational criterion for distinguishing weak AI (tools) from genuine AGI. **Keywords:** AI safety; game theory; a priori status; value alignment; group ontology; information asymmetry

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Cite This Study

易聃 林 (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a7999219c20a9bbd3184ca0https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21850953
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