Why Logical Anti-Exceptionalism as Continuity is Not Dead

Abstract Logical anti-exceptionalism (AEL) is the view that logic is not exceptional. It has been framed either as a thesis that logic is continuous with science , or, more recently, as a thesis according to which logic is unexceptional because it rejects some of the traditional features of logic (generality, a priority, necessity, analiticity…). The latter view has been argued to be a superior characterization of the general view over the former; it is said that it not only avoids difficulties of AEL as continuity, but also has benefits of its own that forcefully recommend its adoption. In this paper, we defend the plausibility of AEL as continuity by (1) arguing that the criticism addressed to the view fails its target and that (2) the alternative characterization of AEL as tradition rejection does not deliver the promised goods. As a result, one is justified in looking for formulations of AEL in terms of continuity, which is less problematic than tradition rejection.