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November 1, 1960The Quarterly Journal of Economics411 citations

Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules

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WVWilliam Vickrey

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Abstract

Arrow's theorem, 507. — Proof of the Arrow impossibility theorem, 509. — The variations from Arrow's treatment, 511. — Relaxing the postulates, 512. — Intransitive social orderings, 513. — Restrictions on individual choice, 513. — Relaxing the independence postulate, 516. — Strategic misrepresentations of preferences, 517. — Social welfare functions based on cardinal utility, 519. — Calibration by threshold of discrimination, 519. — Independence of marginal utilities as a criterion of cardinality, 522. — Risk, utility and income distribution, 523. — Interpersonal comparisons and differences in tastes, 525. — Utility calibration in terms of a field of alternatives, 526. — Different concepts of a field of alternatives, 528. — Economic choice and socio-political choice, 530. — Evaluation and role identification, 530. — A hierarchy of social evaluations, 531. — Possible extremes of egalitarianism and anti-egalitarianism, 532. — Social choice in a dynamic world, 534. — The role of economics, 534.

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Cite This Study

William Vickrey (1960) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a9e3b993b6f5c7ac00565aahttps://doi.org/10.2307/1884349
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