Social camouflaging—broadly defined as the suppression or modulation of autistic traits to conform to neurotypical social norms—has become a dominant explanatory construct in autism research. It is routinely presented as both an adaptive coping strategy and a clinical risk factor, linked to exhaustion, suicidality, and identity confusion. Yet despite its empirical and cultural traction, the concept has not undergone sustained philosophical scrutiny. This paper offers a critical analysis of camouflaging through four philosophical lenses: ontological, epistemological, logical, and ethical. We argue that the construct (1) lacks ontological stability, as it fails to identify a coherent class of phenomena distinguishable from adjacent constructs; (2) is sustained by epistemically circular and theory-laden methodologies that presuppose what they purport to measure; (3) embeds logical inconsistencies, particularly in its attribution of intentionality to agents diagnosed partly on the basis of reduced social reasoning; and (4) perpetuates ethical harm by individualising structural burdens and pathologising context-sensitive adaptation. Drawing on alternative conceptual frameworks—including neuroperformativity, rhizomatic identity, world-travelling, and ecological adaptation—we propose that research and clinical practice would be better served by models that affirm neurodivergent agency without encoding normative expectations of conformity. Rather than refining the camouflaging construct, we advocate its dismantling on grounds of conceptual incoherence and epistemic injustice. A philosophically and ethically adequate account of autistic social navigation must begin not with what is concealed, but with the norms that render difference invisible.
Marios Adamou (Tue,) studied this question.