The United Nations Convention against Cybercrime introduces a model of public-private collaborative governance, establishing procedural obligations for service providers and other private entities to assist state law enforcement authorities in data preservation, disclosure, analysis, and transmission. This institutional arrangement signifies a normative shift in global cybercrime governance—from a traditional state-centric paradigm to one characterized by multi-stakeholder cooperation. While this mechanism holds potential for filling normative and operational lacunae in practice, it is simultaneously confronted with structural challenges, including ambiguous boundaries of obligations, the absence of clearly defined procedural frameworks, and an imbalanced allocation of rights and responsibilities. In parallel, China's domestic legal framework has, to a certain extent, preliminarily established a public-private collaboration system across various dimensions. However, it similarly grapples with a series of practical deficiencies, such as regulatory fragmentation, the indeterminate legal status of private actors, unclear procedural pathways for cooperation, and insufficient mechanisms for incentives and remedies. To address both the institutional challenges posed by the Convention and the pragmatic demands of domestic governance, it is imperative to reconstruct the functional taxonomy and legal positioning of platform entities, delineate the rights and obligations associated with distinct forms of collaboration, and advance the standardization of cooperative procedures and cross-border data governance regimes. Furthermore, supporting mechanisms such as exemption clauses and diversified remedies should be institutionalized. Ultimately, this would contribute to the construction of a public-private governance framework for cybercrime that is procedurally legitimate, substantively effective, and compatible with international norms.
Ke‐Xuan Liu (Mon,) studied this question.