When it is (and is not) Blameworthy to Break the Rules

Abstract While the claim that moral ignorance exculpates is quite controversial, the parallel claim with respect to non-moral ignorance seems to be universally accepted. As a starting point, we can state this claim as follows: Non-moral Ignorance Exculpates: If an agent did everything that could be reasonably expected of her to inquire into some empirical issue as to whether P, the seeming truth of P played the appropriate role in the agent’s motivation to Φ, and the agent would not have merited blame for Φ-ing if P had been the case, then the agent does not merit blame for Φ-ing. In this paper, I aim to accomplish two tasks. First, I argue that NMIE is false in certain cases in which, by Φ-ing, the agent violates a course-grained, reasonable community norm without knowing that doing so is in everyone’s best interests. Second, I argue that, while moral ignorance, like non-moral ignorance, does not exculpate when community norms are violated in this manner, it does exculpate when they are not. With these two tasks accomplished, we will see the striking parallels in the manner in which both moral and non-moral ignorance exculpate.