Many application areas such as influence maximization with Formula: see text topics, sensor placement with Formula: see text type sensors, multi-cooperative games, et al. are captured by maximizing Formula: see text-submodular objectives under a knapsack constraint. Assuming that the items in the ground set are strategic agents with private costs, a natural model of procurement auctions may be generated. Within the budget constraint, an auctioneer consisting of Formula: see text departments strives to maximize his valuation function. Using the simultaneous greedy technique, we investigate the case of non-monotone Formula: see text-submodular valuation functions and propose truthful, budget-feasible, and Formula: see text-approximation mechanisms in polynomial time for both online and offline procurement auctions.
Zhang et al. (Sat,) studied this question.
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