The decade from 1990 to 2001 marked one of the most important phases in Pakistan–United States political relations. With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington’s strategic interest in Pakistan reduced significantly. The imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment in 1990, due to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, resulted in the postponement of military and economic assistance, creating mistrust and a widening gap between the two states. Throughout the early 1990s, political instability in Pakistan, coupled with U.S. concerns regarding nuclear proliferation and alleged support for militant groups, further strained ties. Limited relief came with the Brown Amendment of 1995, but this did little to restore full cooperation. The 1998 nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan triggered additional U.S. sanctions, while the 1999 Kargil war and subsequent military takeover by General Pervez Musharraf deepened Washington’s suspicion about Pakistan’s political stability and democratic commitment. By 2000, relations were at their lowest ebb, highlighted by President Bill Clinton’s brief and symbolic stop in Pakistan during his South Asian tour, which underscored Pakistan’s growing separation in U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, dramatically reshaped the geopolitical context, compelling the United States to re-engage with Pakistan as a frontline ally in the War on Terror. This paper argues that the period from 1990 to 2001 represented a low point in Pakistan U.S. relations, dominated by sanctions, mistrust, and political separation, yet it laid the foundation for a renewed strategic partnership in the post-9/11 era.
Faiz et al. (Fri,) studied this question.