Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) present a paradox for theories of consciousness.Defined by phenomenological simplicity, they are nonetheless accompanied by unexpectedly highneural signal diversity. Traditionally, entropy has been interpreted as a marker ofphenomenological richness, exemplified by psychedelic states. Yet MPEs such as advancedabsorptive meditation (jhāna) or 5-MeO-DMT exhibit high entropy despite radically reducedexperiential content. This tension—the entropy–content paradox—challenges the entropic brainhypothesis and calls for a refined framework. We propose that entropy does not directly index therichness of conscious content, but rather the grain of inference by which the brain resolvesvariability. Psychedelics exemplify a fine-grained regime, in which loosened constraints amplifyfluctuations into proliferating content, whereas MPEs exemplify a coarse-grained regime, in whichrigid stabilization smooths over variability into contentless awareness. Both regimes elevateentropy, but they diverge in phenomenology and perturbational signatures. Recognizing thisdissociation refines the entropic brain hypothesis and positions MPEs as decisive test cases forcomputational theories of consciousness.
Mago et al. (Wed,) studied this question.