Legislative oversight is a constitutional mandate in the South African system of governance for maintaining an accountable public service. In practice, the implementation of this mandate is facing complexities arising from poor performance, maladministration, abuse of state power, and corruption scandals affecting governance at all levels. This study aims to explore the implementation of legislative oversight towards enhancing executive accountability to improve service delivery in the Limpopo Province. To guide the study, principal-agent theory was adopted as a theoretical perspective, and qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted to collect data from participants of this study. The finding shows that there was an inconsistent implementation of the oversight system, particularly in the monitoring of executive conduct via public hearings, meetings, reports, site visits, regular reviews, and public engagement processes. The data also highlights that the process of oversight implementation was affected by capacity constraints, a shortage of resources, political interference, ineffective consequence management, and bureaucratic red tape, which undermined the efforts to enforce executive accountability and transparency in the province. Thus, robust collaboration among the legislature and provincial departments, increased resource allocation, and enhanced political commitments are needed to consolidate accountable governance in the context of current political shifts that demand more proactive and innovative legislative oversight systems and mechanisms. This study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding accountable governance and public service delivery in South Africa.
THELELE et al. (Tue,) studied this question.