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Indian economic and strategic involvement in the Middle East has seen a transformation over the past two decades. This development has happened as many observers remark a gradual decline of US influence juxtaposed with China’s growing presence in the region. This article aims to assess how India has managed its bilateral relations with China within this region of increasing economic and strategic interest. Despite a growing literature on the China-India rivalry in Southeast Asia, South Asia or Central Asia, there is a notable dearth of scholarship on the China–India rivalry and its implications in the Middle East. Filling this gap, this article focuses on explaining how India has adapted its policies towards China’s rising influence in Middle Eastern politics. The core argument is that India’s strategy has been shaped by both a perception of declining US’ engagement in the Middle East and by opportunities created by new strategic hedging strategies from key regional players such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. The article determines that India moved over the last decade from a strategy of buck-passing on US’ security provision to one of partial soft balancing of China’s strategic presence in the Middle East. However, the article also notes the limitations of standard theories of balance-of-power and strategic hedging to account for India’s multifaceted approach towards a regional order in flux.
Nicolas Blarel (Tue,) studied this question.