The poverty of postmodernist constructivism: And a case for naturalism out of Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein

Abstract This essay develops a naturalist framework based on Hume, Darwin, and Wittgenstein against postmodernist constructivism. That framework claims universal features of human biology, cognition, and behavior to explain our cultural histories, running contrary to two core constructivist doctrines of postmodernist scholarship: mutual opacity and epistemic violence . Mutual opacity posits the incommensurability of systems rooted in differing contexts, cultures, and group identities, while epistemic violence morally impugns the extension of the knowledge claims of any such system beyond its strictly localized boundaries. This is the extension that universalist approaches, like naturalism, are recriminated against owing to their claims to discover encompassing standpoint‐independent and transcultural features of human constitution and modes of life. Comparative evaluation of these approaches exposes the failure of postmodernist constructivism to explain parallel practices, conventions, and institutions across human cultural histories, which universalist naturalism succeeds at, while moreover revealing how this failure undermines its agendas of social justice.