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Low-carbon technology innovation is an important measure to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction. However, the external policy environment and high investment in innovation are the important factors affecting enterprises' choice of low-carbon innovation strategies. Although there are many articles on carbon regulation policies, few literatures on the issue of low-carbon technology innovation of enterprises under the compound carbon policy, and the effectiveness of government supervision in the process of policy implementation was ignored. From the perspective of government supervision, this article innovatively proposes a compound carbon policy with carbon trading and carbon tax as a punitive auxiliary means, and considers enterprises' tolerance to carbon policies. With a game model among participants, the interaction between compound carbon policy, government supervision and enterprise low-carbon innovation strategy is simulated. The results show that when enterprises fear the high transaction costs in the carbon market and have strong motivation to steal emissions, the carbon trading policy has limited incentive effect. In this case, the government can promote enterprise innovation by directly regulating carbon tax rate and maintaining appropriate supervision. Further research shows that the implementation of preferential income tax policy for low-carbon innovative enterprises can reduce the difficulty and regulatory cost of government incentive for enterprise innovation, and strengthen the policy effect of carbon trading. In addition, this article puts forward some ideas to provide help for optimizing China's low-carbon oriented carbon policies.
Gu et al. (Sun,) studied this question.