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Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy continues to spark debate among theorists across the political spectrum. Much of the disagreement centres on the nature of rule-following, and the implications that it has for political thought and practice. In this paper, I explore a critical part of Wittgenstein's explanation of rule-following that is often overlooked: the ‘civic status of a contradiction’. I consider how the collective, conventional properties of rule-following practice shape language- and concept-use. I contend that debates over the political implications of rule-following have tended to fixate on one dimension of Wittgenstein's work: social and epistemic emancipation. And I propose an alternative model of rule-following that harnesses the theoretical framework of self-realisation in order to help us to understand how we collectively follow and modify rules.
Richard James Elliott (Fri,) studied this question.