A PRISMA-driven systematic mapping study on system assurance weakeners

An assurance case is a structured hierarchy of claims aiming at demonstrating that a mission-critical system supports specific requirements (e.g., safety, security, privacy). The presence of assurance weakeners (i.e., assurance deficits, logical fallacies) in assurance cases reflects insufficient evidence, knowledge, or gaps in reasoning. These weakeners can undermine confidence in assurance arguments, potentially hindering the verification of mission-critical system capabilities which could result in catastrophic outcomes (e.g., loss of lives). Given the growing interest in employing assurance cases to ensure that systems are developed to meet their requirements, exploring the management of assurance weakeners becomes beneficial. As a stepping stone for future research on assurance weakeners, we aim to initiate the first comprehensive systematic mapping study on this subject. We followed the well-established PRISMA 2020 and SEGRESS guidelines to conduct our systematic mapping study. We searched for primary studies in five digital libraries and focused on the 2012–2023 publication year range. Our selection criteria focused on studies addressing assurance weakeners from a qualitative standpoint, resulting in the inclusion of 39 primary studies in our systematic review. Our systematic mapping study reports a taxonomy (map) that provides a uniform categorization of assurance weakeners and approaches proposed to manage them from a qualitative perspective. The taxonomy classifies weakeners in four categories: aleatory, epistemic, ontological, and argument uncertainty. Additionally, it classifies approaches supporting the management of weakeners in three main categories: representation, identification and mitigation approaches. Our study findings suggest that the SACM (Structured Assurance Case Metamodel) – a standard specified by the OMG (Object Management Group) – offers a comprehensive range of capabilities to capture structured arguments and reason about their potential assurance weakeners. Our findings also suggest novel assurance weakener management approaches should be proposed to better assure mission-critical systems.