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Abstract In this Article, I extend the analysis of controlling shareholders typically reflected in corporate governance scholarship—which is fundamentally framed in terms of shareholder wealth creation and diversion at the behest of the controller—to the increasing (geo)political significance of firms with controlling shareholders. This effort requires shifting the unit of analysis to the fusion of political-economic power inherent in corporate control and examining the implications of this fusion beyond the boundaries of the firm itself. I illustrate the approach by analyzing examples from a variety of new and old corporate capitalist systems operating globally today, and by surveying numerous policy domains in which firms with controlling shareholders are key protagonists: national security and economic sanctions, stock exchange competition, corporate influence on domestic political systems, and ESG. Expanding the lens through which controlling shareholders are viewed sheds light on their considerable influence in largely unexplored realms of wide-ranging geostrategic and political importance.
Curtis J. Milhaupt (Sat,) studied this question.