What is Legal Reasoning?

Abstract Pursuant to the aims and scope of the Special Issue it is part of, this invited contribution seeks to shed new light on the nature and working logic of legal reasoning. It does so by engaging with two of the most authoritative views on the subject which have recently been put forward in the Common law world—namely, Lord Hoffmann’s, and Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin’s. A key-concern of the Anglophone debate on legal reasoning is whether it is a specialistic type of reasoning requiring ad hoc education and training, or ordinary reasoning subject to ordinary rules of language (i.e. sentence construction, interpretation, etc.). The article argues that compelling though they are, these sorts of enquiries do not help to understand what legal reasoning really is and how it operates. In particular, it argues that if we are to understand what legal reasoning is and how it works, we ought to examine the propositions it aims to craft and support. In so arguing, the article further shows that exploring law’s nature and operations as an intellectual means for social ordering also helps to understand how law works as a regulatory phenomenon more generally.