Islamic Political Alignment in Indonesia: Does It Truly Hold?

Islamic Political Alignment in Indonesia:Does It Truly Hold? Noory Okthariza (bio) The recent upsurge in studying "democratic backsliding" is partly driven by the understanding that backsliding is a distinct concept from "political transition" in that it entails a slow, fine-grained degree of change associated with a declining trend in democratic quality and governance.1 Democratic backsliding is also different than the "hybrid regime"—a popular term used in the early 2000s—in the sense that the latter emphasizes its application to predominantly autocratic countries that allow a certain degree of electoral competition, whereas the former highlights the concerning progression when democracy has already become fairly established. Although not inevitable, the constant and unconstrained process of democratic backsliding may lead to democratic breakdown.2 Or at best, it may lead to protracted stagnation, marked by weak political participation and social redistribution, as proponents of functionalist democracy would argue. Indonesia is not exempt from this phenomenon. Its recent 2024 election shows how the accumulation of executive power—in this case under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo—can influence the fairness of electoral competition. In the lead-up to the election, Jokowi weakened institutional checks on the executive by curtailing the power of opposition groups. He paralyzed, or at least politicized, the already vulnerable law-enforcement agencies, notably diminishing the independence of the anticorruption agency (the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi). The apex was his engineering of the constitutional court's decision regarding the age limit for presidential and vice presidential candidates, allowing his son Gibran Rakabuming Raka to run as a candidate and ultimately be elected vice president. Against this backdrop, Diego Fossati's book Unity through Division: Political Islam, Representation and Democracy in Indonesia presents a End Page 213 puzzle worth exploring: Despite its perceptible decline, why do Indonesians still express strong satisfaction with the course of their democracy? Why do Indonesians remain highly convinced that democracy is the best form of government? What are the underlying factors for such trust and satisfaction? The Ordering Mechanism of Political Islam The easiest answers to those questions are well known: individuals and countries may differ substantially in their understanding of what democracy is. Some may favor a functionalist view ("democracy must deliver"), while others might emphasize meaningful participation and representation. Of course, in practice, this distinction is not mutually exclusive. Fossati draws more insights from the latter camp to construct his theoretical framework. He argues that it is deeply rooted political Islam that provides both political expression and a policy platform, offering meaning and tenacity, for its supporters to advance their agenda within the democratic framework. Readers of Indonesian politics will notice that Fossati's argument about the role of Islam in politics is not unfamiliar. Scholars have observed the origins and power of political Islam from both political science and historical-sociological perspectives.3 But what is interesting and provocative is Fossati's claim that there is a striking degree of congruence between elites and voters on many issues, especially regarding the role of Islam in the public sphere. Voters and elites may have amorphous positions on economic and redistributive policies, but when it comes to the role of religion, their stances become noticeable. This difference can be seen as a continuum where Islamist-leaning parties are at the more conservative end and pluralist parties are at the other extreme, with moderate groups in the middle. In short, ideological linkages exist and partisan identifications in some way drive the dynamics of competitive elections. Given Fossati's extensive use of elite and public opinion surveys, there is a wealth of empirical detail to cover. The book demonstrates that voters in general tend to be more conservative than politicians (the baseline roughly stands at 45% and 25%, respectively, see p. 139). As demonstrated End Page 214 in the book's experimental section, voters can also become even more conservative when they are confronted with religious vignettes that signal the stances of parties or candidates on policy issues. In contrast, pluralist voters will go further in objecting to such parties and candidates associated with religious cues. The author provides a fresh perspective by reinstating the role of ideology, which seemingly has been considered less important in...