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Abstract Hostage-taking is often portrayed as non-lethal violence. Upon the receipt of demands, victims are expected to be released alive. Despite this, large evidence points to egregious forms of hostage killing in civil war. Why, then, do some organizations kill hostages? I argue organizations execute hostages as part of a punitive governance strategy in their areas of operation. Hostage-taking and killing can be used as a corrective action to exercise control over the population. Victims accused of acts that undermine the rebel regime are more likely to be killed than those taken for other purposes. I test the theory in the case of the Islamic State in Iraq with novel and granular data on violence in the thirty-one districts the organization governed between 2013 and 2018. The findings unveil important insights for policy and research.
Blair Welsh (Tue,) studied this question.