Strategic clarity or calamity? Competing logics of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait

Abstract What is the best way to restore or uphold deterrence when an existing deterrent is perceived to have decayed? One common answer is that deterrers should simply add more of the ingredients that generally make for strong deterrents: more certainty that threats will be carried out, more capabilities to inflict severe punishments upon an adversary, and greater capacity to carry out threats with celerity (speed). This answer draws upon an intuitive quantitative logic that more is always better when it comes to dissuading an adversary from taking unwanted actions. In this article, however, we explain how following this quantitative logic can have the unintended consequence of worsening security relations and provoking war, especially under conditions of shifting power. Using proposals for the United States to provide ‘strategic clarity’ regarding its intentions to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression as a case-study, we show how efforts to maximize the certainty, severity and celerity of threats can backfire in practice. In general terms, our conclusion is that scholars and policy practitioners must assess the viability of deterrents from a qualitative perspective. With specific reference to Taiwan, we find that strategic clarity would be unlikely to strengthen deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.