ABSTRACT The long history of persecution of the Rohingya minority is evident in three major instances of forced mass migration, most notably in 2017 when large‐scale violence, perpetrated by the Tatamdaw, forced hundreds of thousands of Rohingya to flee Rakhine State into Bangladesh. Bilateral tensions simmering over this issue were brought to the multilateral table in 2015, when Rohingya fled Myanmar across the Bay of Bengal seeking refuge in Southeast Asian countries, and in 2016 when Myanmar's civilian‐led government briefed ASEAN foreign ministers on the “security threat in Rakhine State”. Though repatriation and humanitarian assistance were offered as a response, the issue was largely unaddressed by both Bangladesh and Myanmar before and after the February 2021 coup. This article argues that the Rohingya Muslim minority has become both a perceived internal and external security threat for both countries since 1992 and the dominant issue in bilateral ties. This paper details postcoup developments in bilateral ties related to the Rohingya, external pressure by China and its failed diplomatic efforts—what we characterize as policies of refoulement disguised as repatriation—and argues that the unknown fate of the Rohingya is compounded when neighboring states and non‐state actors are fully considered.
Cogan et al. (Wed,) studied this question.