Abstract In recent years, there has been a flurry of philosophical interest focused on the ethics of so-called ‘tainted commemorations,’ i.e. public commemorations, usually monuments, that honor someone who is now widely regarded as dishonorable. At the same time, others have expressed deeper, and more general, worries about monuments. According to these critics, there is something objectionable about monumental commemorations of individuals, even if the individuals in question are not now regarded as morally flawed. In this paper, I reconstruct and assess four generalized objections to monumental commemoration of individuals. After setting forth and critically assessing these four arguments against monumental commemoration, I will offer my own novel objection to monumental commemoration: I will argue that insofar as monumental commemorations of individuals encourage us to publicly value an actual person as a symbol, they are morally dangerous.
Macalester Bell (Fri,) studied this question.