The modern constitutional legal order is undergoing a fundamental transformation of its basic postulates, linked to a qualitative change in the role of executive power within the public administration system. The relevance of this study is determined by an objective shift in the architecture of state power, where administrative bodies, traditionally perceived as instruments for law enforcement, are becoming full-fledged subjects of the constitutional process. Global challenges, rapid digitization of governance, and the need for prompt responses to crises catalyze the process of latent "administrative law-making," which establishes the real boundaries of citizens' constitutional rights. In domestic legal science, the understanding of the phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism is at an initial stage, unlike foreign doctrine, where the discussion is quite intense. The subject of the study is the evolution of the constitutional legal order in the context of the transformation of public power and the strengthening of the role of administrative bodies in interpreting constitutional norms. Special attention is paid to analyzing normative contradictions arising at the intersection of constitutional and administrative law in the implementation of the principles of the rule of law. The research aims to identify institutional mechanisms for harmonizing the relationship between executive power and constitutional guarantees of individual rights in the context of the digital transformation of governance. The methodology of the study is based on a systematic analysis of the functioning of legal institutions in the context of real state governance practices, as well as on a comparative legal method involving data from the judicial practices of the highest judicial bodies and doctrinal concepts. The scientific novelty lies in conceptualizing administrative constitutionalism not as a form of "constitutionalization" of administrative law, but as an independent phenomenon of the post-classical paradigm of constitutionalism. The study identifies and systematizes specific normative contradictions between constitutional principles and subordinate regulation, manifesting under conditions of institutional asymmetry. A theoretical model for the institutionalization of administrative constitutionalism is proposed through the development of a set of legislative, organizational, and doctrinal measures. The necessity of codifying administrative procedures at the constitutional-legal level and forming a mechanism for "constitutional accountability" of executive power is substantiated. It is proven that administrative constitutionalism should be viewed not as a threat to the rule of law but as a way to adapt its principles to the new managerial realities of the 21st century. As a result of the study, the legal foundations of functional constitutionalism are formulated, capable of combining the dynamism of administrative response with solid guarantees of rights and freedoms of the individual.
Sergei Yur'evich Poyarkov (Mon,) studied this question.