The number of geese foraging in agricultural fields and causing damage to crops is increasing. Farmers attempt to reduce damage using passive, active, auditory, and combined deterrent measures, accommodation fields and, increasingly, derogation shooting. For protected geese like the barnacle goose Branta leucopsis and huntable species outside the hunting season, it is a legal requirement within the EU that other deterrent measures have proven insufficient before a derogation permit can be granted. However, there is a lack of guidance regarding the effectiveness of different measures. Via in-person interviews with 54 Danish farmers experiencing problems with wintering barnacle geese we analyse farmers’ experiences with deterrence methods to provide an overview of their effectiveness, defined by duration and area coverage. The information obtained is far more extensive than what could realistically be achieved through scientific experiments. We check the validity of responses by comparing reports with existing scientific evidence. Passive deterrents (e.g., scarecrows) cover a few hectares and have a duration effect of 4–6 days, but only until the geese habituate. Active measures (e.g., a person walking into the field) and auditory deterrents (firing scare shots) have high area effect but short duration. Largest area/duration effects are achieved using gas cannons, sound deterrents and derogation shooting. Intensified active deterrence or increased density of passive deterrents enhance effectiveness but require greater investments of time and resources. Effective derogation shooting requires that hunters can respond quickly when needed. Hunting lease agreements regarding hunters’ contributions to deterrence and derogation can enhance cooperation and problem-solving. In addition, cooperation between neighboring farmers, including accommodation areas, furthers effectiveness. The cost of geese (yield loss plus time/materials) can have a sizeable impact on the farmers’ operation profits. Lack of effort may be due to farmers either coping with the problem, having given up deterrence, or unawareness of more effective deterrence.
Sørensen et al. (Thu,) studied this question.