Epistemic trespassers are often defined as individuals who have the expertise in one field but pass judgments, make assertions, and hold beliefs about the research and findings in another field. Similarly, experts are defined as thinkers who have the skills of a particular field and are familiar with its evidence. However, according to Ballantyne, being an intellectual expert is not confined to the credentials (i.e. common social markers of expertise) someone might have. In this paper, my goal is twofold. First, I aim to show that Ballantyne’s definition of an expert is not only commonsensical but historically accurate too despite the fact that it does not coincide with what we nowadays identify as experts (namely credentialed individuals from accredited institutions); i.e., that early science originated as a kind of knowledge and method open to the public and that institutions such as the Royal Society were places where the public could observe for themselves ‘the facts of nature’. Second, as much as the above definition of expertise captures the open spirit of scientific endeavor, it poses a problem when we need to decide in real life (and usually in a time sensitive manner) who the experts are. I argue that despite such challenges, policymakers should be open to external critics of scientific findings and not rely solely on credentials when recognizing experts. I conclude with some thoughts on how policymakers could identify intellectual experts so that not all critics who lack an official university degree are excluded, but also so that not all those without a degree are let in.
Ljiljana Radenović (Mon,) studied this question.