ABSTRACT According to the acquaintance theory of introspection, certain special features of our knowledge of our own minds are grounded in our acquaintance with—that is, direct awareness of—our minds. The acquaintance theory is ancient, but it began to take a new shape in the 20th century. It has since become one of the leading theories of introspection. But, more recently, some philosophers have started thinking differently about what knowledge by acquaintance is, what constitutes it. According to late‐20th‐century acquaintance theorists, it is constituted by beliefs based on acquaintance. However, according to more recent acquaintance theorists, acquaintance is itself a sui generis, non‐propositional form of knowledge. This development is highly relevant to the acquaintance theory of introspection, but it has yet to be shown how. In this paper, I introduce and defend a new acquaintance theory of introspection. I start by describing the old acquaintance theory of introspection. Then I outline some of the most prominent objections to it, as well as standard responses. Then I introduce the new acquaintance theory of introspection and show how it is an improvement over the old theory—in some ways, a vast improvement.
Matt Duncan (Mon,) studied this question.